


The US, China & South Korea's Semiconductor Industrial Strategy



2022.11.2

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2. The reorganization of the global value chain in semiconductor industry

3. Impact of US-led restructuring of global value chain

4. Long-term aftermath of the reorganization of the global value chain

5. Strategy of Korea in the era of US-China's techno-economic competition


6. Conclusions



Shift of semiconductor industry:


US (before 1970s) \rightarrow Japan (1970-2000s) \rightarrow S. Korea & Taiwan (2000-2020s)

 \rightarrow S. Korea, Taiwan, China, & US (2020s-)



Hegemony in semiconductor industry:


- Global sales: US (25-30%) vs. China (20-25%)
- S. Korea & Taiwan: occupying over 85% of semiconductor foundry
- S. Korea, US, & China: occupying over 90% of memory chip (DRAM, 3D NAND)
- US, Japan, & Netherlands: occupying over 90% of semiconductor fabrication equipment




Rapid growth of semiconductor industry in China since 2010s

- Driven by the Chinese government (Federal & State)
- Forming diverse industrial ecosystems over the country








Notable points

- Fast & vast growth of fabless (design companies for semiconductor chips)
- Indicating fundamental growth in the industrial ecosystem
- Indicating demand growth in diverse chips (from memory to electrical system chips)
- Implying AI- or AIX-driven chip demand (GPU, NPU, TPU, etc.)



Notable points

- Hierarchy in the industry: From design to fabrication, from fabless to foundry,

from materials to devices, from equipment to technical IPs, from legacy chip to AI

China 5 Year Plan for Semiconductors



China 14th 5-year plan to see IC foundry capacity expand 40%, says Digitimes Research

Driving forces

- China's 5-year plan (12th (2011-2015), 13th (2016-2020), 14th (2021-2025), beyond)
- Accumulated investment for 14th 5 yr plan: ~\$20 bn (Government), ~\$100 bn (Private)
- Government support: subsidies, tax exemptions, fund raising, long-term investment,


expansion of training programs for engineer at universities

What will happen next?

- Keep growing: > 50% of global demand will be from China up to 2025 (\$200-300 bn)
- Design sales: \$48 bn (2020) \rightarrow \$65 bn (2025)
- OSAT (packaging & test): \$ 40 bn (2020) \rightarrow \$60 bn (2025)
- Foundry: \$32 bn (2020) \rightarrow \$70 bn (2025)

What will this happen?

- 75% of smartphones, 80% of tablet PCs, 90% of laptops, 50% of digital TVs, 90% of display panels, 60% of communication chips/set-top boxes are produced in China
- Government's will to increase in the investment
- Nation-wide technology innovation over all sub-areas of the industry





What are the pitfalls facing China's growth? Interior factors

- Low efficiency (duplicated investment, R&D, University-driven innovation)
- Low stability (when without government subsidies)
- Low ROI (weak competitive power in global market)
- Rapid growth of number of closed companies (increase in bad debts)
- Tech scam & corruption of the Government & companies
- Duplicated investment (risk of bubbles)

What are the pitfalls facing China's growth? *Exterior factors*

- Statecraft: Long-term policy of the US on reorganizing/reconstructing GVC of semiconductor
- Sanctions: Expansion of technology gap (i.e., Foundry, GPU, & DRAM)
- Pin-point ban: Deviation from the global standard (i.e., GAAFET, MBCFET, CFET, & beyond)
- Cost rise: Heavy dependences on import (low self-sufficiency (~17%))

facilities/equipment (~90%), materials (~80%), devices (~75%), & products (~75%)

- Future direction: Diversion in future tech (discrepancy in next generation semiconductors)

Bloomberg

China's Days as World's Factory Are Over, IPhone Maker Says

By <u>Debby Wu</u> August 12, 2020, 2:04 AM EDT *Updated on August 13, 2020, 12:49 AM EDT*





Details on techno-economic sanctions of the US on China's semiconductor industry

- Prohibition of importing EUV lithography (ASML, 2019)
- Prohibition of using technical IPs on next FET Chips (MBCFET & GAAFET, 2020)
- Prohibition of importing DUV lithography & related equipment (ASML, LAM, Applied Mater, etc., 2022)
- Prohibition of using GPU (AMD & NVIDIA, 2022): Targeting China's AI & AIX (including military purposes)
- Next movement (predicted): Equipment, OSAT, Memory, Design IP, Materials, & beyond




SK Hynix's acquisition of Intel's NAND (\$9 bn, 2020)



Recent trend in the reorganization of global semiconductor industry

- Big M&A: among hardware (HW)-software (SW), SW-applications, SW-SW, HW-AI, etc.
- Changes in the global supply chain: cost spike
- Formation of econo- & techno-political blocks: IPEF, QUAD, AUKUS, & Chip4
- Protectionism: Reshoring (Chip-for-America, IRA) & friend-shoring trend
- Regional uncertainty: Russia-Ukraine war
- Global crisis: Climate crisis (RE100, requirement for the carbon neutrality)


Semiconductor Supply Chain



Source: SIA report (2020)

Global value chain in semiconductor industry:

- Foundry: S. Korea (Samsung electronics) & Taiwan (TSMC)
- Design IP (EDA): US (Cadence, Synopsis)
- Fab equipment: US (LAM, Applied Mater.), Japan (TOK), & Netherlands (ASML)
- Memory: S. Korea (Samsung, Hynix), US (Micron), Japan (Kioxia), & China (YMTC)
- Materials: US (LAM, Applied Mater), Japan (Sinetsu, TOK), Korea (Dongjin)
- Device: US, Japan




Key players in the global value chain in semiconductor industry:

- 1. Overall value share: US, S. Korea, Japan, EU, China, Southeast Asia, Taiwan
- 2. Overall market size: US, China, Southeast Asia, EU, Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan


East Asia countries (China, Taiwan, S. Korea, & Japan)

shares over 48% value & 34% market.

Intensification of inter-dependences among the key players in last 2 decades



Major semiconductor trade corridors¹ (2019, Billions)



Heavy dependences of Taiwan, S. Korea, & Japan on semiconductor value chain with China & US \rightarrow Large increase in cost for all players if there is reorganization driven by block formation \rightarrow S. Korea & Taiwan will suffer the most severe damage by the reorganization

Impact of US-led restructuring of global value chain

Heavy dependences of key players on semiconductor value chain with China & US

- \rightarrow Large increase in cost for all players if there is severe reorganization (block formation)
- Ex) World-wide semiconductor trade (as of 2020): $1.7 \text{ Tn} \rightarrow 1.4 \text{ Tn}$

Additional cost rise:

- \$170 bn to \$250 bn yearly (for China),
- \$50 bn to \$150 bn yearly (for US),
- \$25 bn to \$80 bn yearly (for S. Korea),
- \$5 bn to \$20 bn (for Taiwan)

Impacts & Sequences:

Reorganization of GVC of semiconductors

- \rightarrow Spike in overall cost \rightarrow Increase in prices of chips
- \rightarrow IT-driven innovation (AI, data-driven, deep-tech, etc.) is slowed down
- \rightarrow Recession: slowed down economic growth for industries depending on semiconductor

Long-term aftermath of the reorganization of the global value chain

Scenario #1


- China will pursue its independence in semiconductor technology
- by developing its own industrial ecosystem or supply chain
- Global semiconductor market is divided into two or more blocks (coexistence of two ore more GVCs?)
- Next generation semiconductor roadmap will diverge (coexistence of two or more standars?)
- China falls in future semiconductor tech (including quantum ICT)

Scenario #2


- US-China will reconcile to recover the global value chain (i.e., US-China semiconductor agreement?)
- Overall cost surge in global semiconductor market can be cooled down.

Scenario #3

- Fall of China in semiconductor industry
 - (as well as other advanced or deep techs (AI or AIX, Li-battery, self-driving cars, etc.))
- China would get back to US-leading semiconductor GVC as a consumer market rather than a key supplier.



(i.e., 20-30 yrs difference btn applications & basic science finding)



Lesson from Netherlands:

- Formation of strong University-Industry collaboration clusters over the country for deep tech
- Formation of diverse ecosystem for semiconductor industry

(from materials to equipment, design to future chips)

- Long-term Government's & EU's investment in R&D (i.e., ASML's EUV project)






suppliers (cameras software, lenses, etc.)	inspection and review	producers thin film metrology	producers lithography metrology (CD, Overlay)	producers litho- graphy metrology (CD, Overlay)	research institutes networks
Adimec	ASML	ASML	ASML	ASML	T UDelft
Frencken	MELLES GRIOT	MELLES GRIOT	MELLES GRIOT	ASM 🛞	TNO invovation for life
Lambest ///	AVANTES	AVANTES	NEDINSCO VENLO	Besi	Dutch Optics Centre
Luxexcel	MASER			LITEO	TU/e
molenaar optics	* FEI	PANalytical		MAPPER	UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE.
PhoeniX Software		irmato 🗘			
TELEDYNE DALSA	INSTRUMENTS	Optics			
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Lesson from Netherlands:

- Formation of ecosystem:
- Not necessarily only for Netherland's companies
- Boundary can be extended to Foreign companies
- Technology transfer from Univ to Companies
- (adjunct professors, sharing facilities, collaborating network)





Expanding ecosystem

Enhancing the contemporary tech gaps (memory, foundry, and fabless)

- Revise tech IP strategy (toward pinpoint IP)
- Smart design of materials to chips
- Strategic R&D

Joining the next generation technology standard groups

- Councils for next generation technology standards
- Closed group for quantum computers & ICTs
- Closed platforms operated by NIST & other US national labs
- Collaboration with leading-edge companies (i.e., Google, IBM, Intel, QUALCOMM, etc.)

- 1. China's growth in semiconductor industry can take over US sooner or later.
- 2. China's policy & investment in semiconductor industry covers all areas.
- 3. Reorganization of the global value chain in semiconductor industry can harm all players including S. Korea & Taiwan as well as US & China.
- 4. Cost rise will slow down techno-economic innovation resulting in economic recession.
- 5. US's sanction on China will be extended to wider range & longer term.
- 6. Korea's strategy should be based on open ecosystem, intensive investment in R&D,& joining next technology leading groups.